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The Propriety of Benefit-Spreading Regulations Under the 
10% Lending Limit of the National Bank Act 
Section 84 of the National Bank Act1 requires that no bank lend 
more than ten percent of its capital stock and surplus to any one 
borrower. The Comptroller of the Currency has issued regulations 
interpreting this lending limit.2 Under these regulations, to deter-
mine whether a bank has complied with the limit, the Comptroller 
combines loans to separate borrowers in some circumstances. 3 As a 
result, a bank can contravene the regulations even if no one bor-
rower accounts for more than ten percent of its capital stock and 
surplus. The Comptroller has two objectives ~ issuing regulations 
requiring the coip.bination of loans: to reduce the risk of bank fail-
ure and to spread the benefits of capital throughout the community. 
A persuasive rationale underlies the use of a lending limit to reduce 
risk: "a constant size portfolio i~ safer with a large number of small 
loans than a small number of large loans of equal quality."4 To re-
duce risk, the regulations require banks to combine loans to nomi-
nally separate borrowers whose financial affairs are so intertwined 
that the bank relies on the same source of funds for repayment.5 Be-
1. Rev. Stat. § 5200, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976) (subsequently referred to as "sec-
tion 84"). 
2. These interpretive regulations do not bind the courts, although they are "entitled to 
some weight." First Natl. Bank of Lincolnwood v. Keller, 318 F. Supp. 339, 343 (N.D. Ill. 
1970). 
3. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.1310, 7.1320, 7.1330 (1980). The first two regulations were formerly in-
terpretive rulings of the Comptroller; they were promulgated as regulations in 1971. See 36 
Fed. Reg. 17,000, 17,002-03 (1971). The last regulation was issued in 1979. See44 Fed. Reg. 
22,712 (1979). 
4. Rappaport, R.S. 5200: Flushing the Piltdown Man Syndrome, 92 BANKING L.J. 956, 968 
(1975). Professor Rappaport argues that modem portfolio theory has advanced beyond the 
rule of thumb approach embodied in the ten percent lending limit. For the purposes of this 
Note, the validity of the risk-reduction theory is not questioned. 
5. The risk-reducing regulations are found in 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.13IO(c)(l)-7.1310(c)(2), 
7.1320(a), 7,1330(a)(I). 12 C.F.R. § 7.13IO(c)(l) and (2) require that 
(I) Obligations ofa parent corporation shall be combined with obligations of all subsidi-
ary corporations in which the parent owns or controls a majority interest. 
(2) If the parent corporation is not borrowing, obligations of subsidiary corporations are 
generally not combined except in the following situations: 
(i) Bank is looking to a single source for repayment of the loan. 
(ii) One or more loans is for the acco=odation of the parent corporation or 
other subsidiary. 
(iii) The borrowing corporations are not separate concerns in reality but merely 
departments or divisions of a single enterprise. 
12 C.F.R. § 7.1320(a) provides that "[u]nder 12 U.S.C. 84 the obligations of the several mem-
bers of a partnership, regardless of the purpose or the use of proceeds are required to be 
combined with obligations of the partnership." 12 C.F.R. § 7.1330(a) states that 
(a) Loans to foreign governments, their agencies, and instrumentalities will be combined 
under 12 U.S.C. § 84 if they fail to meet either of the following tests: 
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cause risk reduction is undisputedly a major purpose of section 84,6 
this Note does not challenge the propriety of risk-reducing loan com-
binations. 
The regulations also attempt to promote benefit-spreading.7 
They require banks to combine loans to separate borrowers who use 
the proceeds for a common purpose, even when the borrowers pos-
sess completely independent means of repayment. 8 By combining 
loans according to purpose in evaluating compliance with the lend-
ing limit, the Comptroller hopes to spread credit throughout the 
( 1) The borrower must have resources or revenue of its own sufficient over time to serv-
ice its debt obligations ("means" test); 
(2) The loan must be obtained for a purpose consistent with the borrower's general busi-
ness {"purpose" test). This does not preclude converting the loan proceeds into local cur-
rency prior to use by the borrowing entity. 
The "means" test of 12 C.F.R. § 7.1330(a)(l) serves a risk-reducing purpose, whereas the "pur-
pose" test of 12 C.F.R. § 7.1330(a)(2) serves a benefit-spreading purpose. See note 8 infra and 
accompanying text. 
6. See text at notes 10-57 infra • 
7. Professor Rappaport coined the term "benefit-spreading." Rappaport, supra note 4 at 
957. 
8. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1310(c)(3) (1980) requires that "[o]bligations of a corporation must be 
combined with any other extension of credit the proceeds of which are used for the benefit of 
the corporation." The regulation has been interpreted by the Comptroller's staff to mean that 
loans to individuals used to purchase interests in existing corporations must be combined with 
the debt of the corporation. See Comptroller Staff Interpretive Letter, [1978-79 Transfer 
Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) ~ 85,089. 
12 C.F.R. § 7.1320(b) (1980) states that "where persons engaged in a common enterprise, 
whether in the form of a partnership, joint venture, or other association, individually borrow 
funds which are to be used in that enterprise, the loans must be considered as a single credit." 
The regulation insists on the combination ofloans issued to separate borrowers with independ-
ent sources of repayment, where the loans are for the use of a common business enterprise, 
even though the enterprise did not borrow from the bank and is not liable for repayment of the 
loans. 
The regulations also require the combination of certain loans issued to foreign govern-
ments and their agencies, and instrumentalities, even though the agency or instrumentality has 
"resources or revenue ofits own sufficient over time to service its debt obligations." 12 C.F.R. 
§ 7.1330(a) (1980). See note 5 supra. The combination of such loans may undesirably affect 
less developed countries, since a government and its agencies and instrumentalities may be the 
only credit-worthy borrowers in the entire country. If 12 C.F.R. § 7.1330 precludes a bank 
from issuing a loan to one of those entities, the bank will probably invest the funds elsewhere 
rather than issue a financially risky loan to a nongovernment borrower. See Comment, 
"Means and Purposes": The Comptroller's Recent Proposed Ruling on National Bank Lending lo 
Foreign Governments, 10 LAW & POLY. INTL. Bus. 1001, 1013 (1978). The Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors did not adopt such a loan combination requirement in drawing up lend-
ing limit regulations for banks under their supervision. See 44 Fed. Reg. 36,005, 36,010 (1979) 
(to be codified as 12 C.F.R. § 211) (popularly known as Regulation K). 
In recent years the Comptroller's staff has greatly expanded the use of the benefit-spreading 
principle. For example, loans to independent corporations are combined with loans to foreign 
governments if all of the loan proceeds go to the foreign government. See 44 Fed. Reg. 22,713 
(1979). Also, personal debt is combined with corporate debt if the individuals and related 
corporations are engaged in a single line of business. See Egerston, Lending Limits, 6 FED, 
BANKING L. REP. (CCH) ~ 85,025 (1977) (The single line of business was the holding of real 
estate.). In addition, though debt of limited partners is generally not combined with partner-
ship debt, if the limited partners purchase their partnership interests with borrowed funds, the 
debts are combined without regard to the repayment ability of the individuals. See Byrd, 
Lending Limits, 6 FED. BANKING L. REP. {CCH) ~85,039 (1977). 
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community and to prevent concentration of credit resources in the 
hands of a few borrowers. Although risk-reducing loan combina-
tions clearly comport with the purpose of the National Bank Act, 
benefit-spreading loan combinations are of doubtful propriety.9 
This Note examines whether the ten percent lending limit of the 
National Bank Act should be used to promote benefit-spreading. 
Section I evaluates the legislative and judicial history of the lending 
limit and concludes that Congress never intended the Comptroller to 
issue regulations to foster benefit-spreading. Section II examines the 
practical ramifications of the benefit-spreading regulations. It con-
cludes that the lending limit cannot effectively foster benefit-spread-
ing without undermining the risk-reducing function of the statute; 
that compliance with the benefit-spreading regulations is costly while 
the penalties for noncompliance are inappropriate and unfair; and 
that existing statutes better promote benefit-spreading while avoid-
ing the pitfalls of the section 84 regulations. The Note therefore con-
cludes that the Comptroller should retract the benefit-spreading 
regulations. Until he does so, courts should ignore the regulations 
and Congress should repudiate the use of section 84 for benefit-
spreading. 
I. 
The Comptroller of the Currency can glean little support for ben-
efit-spreading regulations from the legislative history of the ten per-
cent lending limit. Neither the language of the statute, nor the 
congressional debate that accompanied each stage of its develop-
ment, nor the court decisions that interpret it indicate a benefit-
spreading purpose of the lending limit. 
On its face, section 84 neither embraces nor rejects the benefit-
spreading principle. The statute's opening language yields little in-
sight into its purposes: 
[t]he total obligations to any national banking association of any per-
son, copartnership, association, or corporation shall at no time exceed 
10 per centum of ... [the bank's] capital stock ... and 10 per centum 
9. When a violation of 12 U.S.C. § 84 is found during a bank examination, the Comptrol-
ler requests the bank to take immediate corrective action. The corrective action normally takes 
the form of a sale of participations. See notes 62 & 66 i,!fra and accompanying text. If a bank 
fails to correct the violation, the Comptroller may seek a cease and desist order in the courts 
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b). 
A violation of 12 U.S.C. § 84 subjects the bank, its directors, officers, and employees to civil 
sanctions under 12 U.S.C. § 93. The Act authorizes civil penalties ofup to $1,000 a day to be 
imposed on the bank or on "any officer, director, employee, agent, or other person participat-
ing in the conduct of the affairs" of the bank that violate the National Bank Act or any regula-
tions issued thereto. 12 U.S.C.A. § 93(b) (Supp. 1979). See also Newman, Reducing the Risk 
of Bank Director Liability, 96 BANKING L.J. 418 (1979). In addition, the directors may be held 
personally liable for the loss on any uncollected loan that exceeds the lending limit. 12 U.S.C. 
§ 93{a) (1976). This sanction is inappropriate as applied to violations resulting from benefit-
spreading combinations. See notes 69-71 i,!fra and accompanying text. 
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of its unimpaired surplus fund. 10 
Nevertheless, the statutory definition of the term "obligations" 
reveals a concern for risk reduction. The statute defines a party's 
obligations to include both its direct liability as the borrower and its 
liability as "indorser, drawer, or guarantor." 11 In so doing, the stat-
ute accounts for both the risk associated with direct liability and the 
risk inherent in the status of suretyship. The statute also defines the 
obligations of copartnerships and associations to include those of 
their individual members. 12 This manifests a concern for risk - a 
desire accurately to gauge ability to extinguish debts - since a 
lender to a copartnership or association must ultimately rely upon 
the credit of its several members. 13 Similarly, the statute defines cor-
porate obligations to include those of subsidiaries in which the cor-
poration "owns or controls a majority interest."14 Because 
corporations and their subsidiaries are interdependent, the insol-
vency of any one UI1i.t will usually affect the financial affairs of the 
others. A parent corporation or its subsidiary is more likely to de-
fault on its loans when its counterpart is insolvent. By combining 
parent and subsidiary obligations, the statute recognizes the risk of 
bank failure should both a parent corporation and its subsidiary de-
fault on their loans due to their financial interdependence.15 
Of course, one might argue that these statutory definitions dis-
play a concern for benefit-spreading as well as risk reduction. Be-
cause they require that the obligations of connected entities be 
combined in assessing compliance with the lending limit, they spread 
capital beyond a small group of interrelated persons and businesses. 
But one should not inf er a benefit-spreading goal from this inciden-
IO. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976). 
11. "The term obligation shall mean the direct liability of the maker or acceptor of paper 
discounted with or sold to such association and the liability of the indorser, drawer, or guaran• 
tor who obtains a loan from or discounts paper with or sells paper under his guarantee to such 
association." 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1976). 
Prior to 1927, a person signing as a guarantor could borrow without limit. This loophole 
was closed in 1927 when Congress adopted the present language of the statute. See note 34 
iefra and accompanying text. The Comptroller will ordinarily consider the liability of an 
indorser, drawer, or guarantor to be an obligation only if the acco=odating party receives a 
portion of the proceeds of the loan. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.l 125(c) (1980). 
12. 12 u.s.c. § 84 (1976). 
13. The individual partners are liable for all partnership debts, UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP 
Acr § 15; Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.A. § 723(a) (Supp. 1979), and the individual 
members of an association are liable for the debts incurred on behalf of the association by their 
actual and apparent agents. H. OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND 
ASSOCIATIONS § 36 (3d ed. 1974). 
14. 12 u.s.c. § 84 (1976). 
15. The second subsection of section 84 lists fourteen exceptions to the general lending 
limit found in the opening subsection. The exceptions eliminate or raise lending limits for 
certain transactions involving low financial risk, 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1)-(9), (13) (1976), and for 
loans financing federal programs, 12 U.S.C. § 84(10)-(12), (14) (1976). Rappaport, supra note 
4 at 974-75, describes the purpose ~d history of each of these exceptions. 
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tal effect. By definition, any rule combining loans of distinguishable 
entities will force banks to distribute funds to a larger number of 
borrowers. But as long as the combinations are based upon interre-
lated sources of repayment, the rule's primary purpose is to reduce 
the risk of large, simultaneous defaults. The spreading of benefits 
resulting from this type of combination is incidental to this risk-re-
ducing purpose. Only when a rule combines loans based on the pur-
pose for which the funds are borrowed, regardless of separate 
sources for repayment, is the rule's benefit-spreading more than inci-
dental. And nothing in the language of section 84 indicates that 
loans to separate borrowers should be combined solely because of a 
common purpose or use. 
The legislative history of section 84 leads to a similar conclusion: 
while members of Congress recognized the incidental benefit-spread-
ing effects of the ten percent lending limit, the limit's primary pur-
pose throughout its history has been to reduce the risk of bank 
failure. A thorough review of congressional proceedings belies the 
Comptroller's claim that Congress enacted the lending limit to pro-
mote benefit-spreading.16 
The lending restrictions now codified in section 84 of title XII of 
the United States Code first appeared in section 47 of the National 
Currency Act of 1863.17 Although Congress considered this Act at 
length, no mention of section 47 appears in any committee reports or 
debates.18 In 1864, Congress replaced the National Currency Act 
16. The Comptroller's purpose for issuing regulations requiring the combination of loans 
to separate borrowers is 
to prevent one individual, or a relatively small group, from borrowing an unduly large 
amount of the bank's deposits for the use of the particular business enterprises in which 
they are engaged. It is intended to safeguard the bank's depositors by spreading the loans 
among a relatively large number of persons engaged in different lines of business. 
12 C.F.R. § 7.1310 (1980). This statement is taken from a 1927 speech in which Representative 
McFadden explains the meaning of the McFadden Banking Act's amendments to 12 U.S.C. 
84. See note 40 infra and accompanying text. The passage implies concern for both benefit-
spreading and risk-reduction. However, as is argued in notes 42-43 infra and accoinpanying 
text, the speech was given after the signing of the Act and does not accurately reflect the 
legislative history of the statute. 
17. Ch. 58, § 47, 12 Stat. 665 (1863). Section 47 stated that 
the total liabilities of any person, or of any company or firm, (including the liabilities of 
the several members thereof,) . _ . shall at no time exceed . . . one tenth part of the 
amount of the capital stock of such [national banking] association actually paid in. 
Deleted portions set a lending limit as high as one third of capital stock for bills of exchange. 
Subsection I of 12 U.S.C. § 84 continues to afford bills of exchange special treatment. 
18. See Rappaport, supra note 4 at 958-59. Comptroller McCulloch advocated that the 
lending limit be eliminated from the 1864 Act. He stated that 
[w]hile it is true that large loans to a single individual or firm should, as a general thing, 
be avoided, there may be, and frequently are, exceptional cases in which such loans are 
both necessary and judicious. I think, therefore, that this is a matter that should be left to 
the discretion of the managers of the banks, and that it can be safely entrusted to them. 
[1863] COMP. CURRENCY ANN. REP., reprinted in SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND 
CURRENCY, FEDERAL BANKING LAWS AND REPORTS at 322,335 (1963). By contending that 
bank managers can safely be entrusted with the discretion to determine whether a loan in 
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with the National Bank Act. In so doing, it reenacted section 47 as 
section 29 and added corporations to the list of entities covered by 
the statute. 19 Again, neither the debates in Congress nor the com-
mittee reports discuss the purpose of the lending limit. It is therefore 
impossible to determine the original legislative purpose in enacting 
the lending restrictions. 20 
excess of the lending limit is "necessary and judicious," the comptroller's statement suggests 
that the purpose of the 1863 Act was to restrict the amount a bank could risk on a single 
borrower, not to spread the benefits of capital throughout the community. 
19. Ch. 56, § 29, 13 Stat. 99 (1864). Section 29 stated that 
the total liabilities to any [national banking] association, of any person, or of any com• 
pany, corporation, or firm for money borrowed, including in the liabilities of a company 
or firm the liabilities of the several members thereof, shall at no time exceed one tenth 
part of the capital stock of such [national banking] association actually paid in. , . , 
Section 29 exempted bills of exchange and commercial paper from the lending limit. 
Congress established the national bank system to promote a uniform bank currency and to 
create a market for government bonds. The first objective reflects a concern for creating a 
financially sound banking community. The second objective was prompted by the financial 
demands of the Civil War. See J. CHAPMAN & R. WESTERFIELD, BRANCH BANKINO 58 
(1942). 
20. One commentator, Allen Rappaport, while recognizing the absence of any legislative 
history surrounding section 47 of the National Currency Act of 1863, Rappaport, supra note 4 
at 958, and section 29 of the National Bank Act of 1864, id. at 959, nevertheless contends that 
Congress first enacted the lending limit for the purpose of benefit-spreading. Id. at 957, 960, 
The basis of his contention is that Congress, in borrowing from state banking laws in drafting 
the national acts, adopted the purpose of the state lending limits, which he asserts was to 
promote benefit-spreading. Id. at 957. In drafting the entire National Bank Act, Congress 
substantially borrowed from the Ohio bank law. Compare National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 
§ 29, 13 Stat. 99 with 43 OHIO LAWS,§ 62, at 24 (1845). To Rappaport's dismay, however, no 
records exist to support his contention that the lending limit in section 62 of the Ohio banking 
law, 43 OHIO LAWS,§ 62, at 24 (1945), was intended to promote benefit-spreading. Rappaport, 
supra note 4, at 958. 
The Ohio statute could arguably be said to rest on a benefit-spreading rationale because it 
pegs the lending limit to the amount of currency the bank is authorized to issue. 43 Omo 
LAWS, § 62, at 24 (1845). But, because the Ohio legislature directly tied the amount of cur-
rency authorized to be issued to the bank's capital stock, 43 Omo LAWS,§§ 19 (branches) and 
31 (independent banks), at 24 (1845), section 62 may instead have been intended to serve a 
risk-reducing function. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the Ohio legislature did 
not explicitly state that section 62 was for the purpose of benefit-spreading, as it had done with 
respect to the geographic apportionment provisions it enacted. 43 Omo LAWS, §§ 2-4, at 24 
(1845).Thus, since legislative history for section 62 is lacking, its purpose cannot be deter• 
mined. 
Not only is the Ohio legislature's purpose unknown, but the intention of Congress cannot 
be said to mirror that of the Ohio legislature. In drafting section 47 and its successor, section 
29, from the Ohio laws, Congress did not base the lending limit on the currency authorized to 
be issued but instead tied the lending limit directly to the bank's capital stock. Compare 
National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, § 47, 12 Stat. 665 and National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 
106, § 29, 13 Stat. 99 with 43 OHIO LAWS § 62, at 24 (1845). Moreover, Congress did not 
duplicate the geographic apportionment provisions that the Ohio legislature had enacted to 
promote benefit-spreading. These differences should not be ignored. Even if the purpose of 
the Ohio statute were known, in the absence of any legislative history, the intentions of Con-
gress cannot be said to be the same as those of the Ohio legislature. 
To salvage his thesis, Rappaport cites the 1886 Report of the Comptroller of the Currency 
for the proposition that, since Congress restricted the number of national banks by limiting 
national bank currency, the lending limit was promulgated to prevent any small group of 
persons from monopolizing this scarce resource. Rappaport, supra note 4, at 960 (quoting 
[1886] COMP. CURRENCY ANN. REP. 473). Congress established a currency circulation limit of 
$300 million in both the 1863 and 1864 Acts. Ch. 58, § 17, 12 Stat. 665 (1863); ch. 106, § 22, 13 
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In 1906, Congress amended section 29 of the National Bank 
Act21 to increase the existing lending limit by ten percent of a bank's 
unimpaired surplus fund. This amendment greatly increased the 
lending limits of most national banks. The first mention of the bene-
fit-spreading principle in Congress occurs in the transcripts of the 
House of Representatives debate on this amendment.22 Representa-
tive Gillespie, an outspoken critic of the amendment, espoused the 
benefit-spreading principle. He feared that increasing the lending 
limit would give "the large borrowers an open field and crowd out 
the small borrower."23 This, he claimed, would undermine what he 
understood to be the purpose of the law: "to make the capital of the 
bank available to as many people as possible without destroying the 
efficiency of the bank."24 Opponents of Representative Gillespie, al-
though sensitive to the needs of small borrowers, argued that it was 
unnecessary to use a low lending limit to protect the small borrower 
because profit and risk-reducing motives lead banks to lend to sev-
eral small borrowers rather than a few large ones.25 
The House voted overwhelmingly (193-7) to increase the lending 
limit,26 indicating that few of Representative Gillespie's fellow con-
gressmen shared his desire to use the lending limit to protect the 
small borrower. Apparently, Congress was more concerned with the 
inability of banks to satisfy business credit needs.27 When the 
amendment reached the Senate, no one raised the issue of benefit-
spreading. Instead, the senators debated the likely effect of raising 
the lending limit on the risk assumed by a bank's shareholders.28 
Stat. 99 (1864). By the end of 1864, national banks had issued only $45 million in currency. 
[1869] COMP. CURRENCY ANN. REP. 596-97. The limit therefore had little impact in the early 
years of the national bank system. While Congress may have had benefit-spreading in mind 
when it enacted the lending limit, it also wanted to establish a sound banking system. See J. 
CHAPMAN & R. WESTERFIELD, supra note 19, at 58. This concern, which requires the limita-
tion of risk, also explains the passage of the lending limit. See ·note 16 _supra. Therefore, 
without the benefit of debates or committee reports to further explain section 47 of the Na-
tional Currency Act, one can only speculate as to congressional intent in initially enacting the 
lending limit. 
21. Ch. 3516, § 5200, 34 Stat. 451 (1906). 
22. See 40 CONG. REC. 5310-14 (1906). 
23. Id. at 5312. 
24. Id. at 5311. Representative Gillespie further asserted that the 
bill comes from the demands of the large concerns of the country to get hold of all the 
available capital. The purpose is to override the principle involved in the present law and 
to respond to that demand that is prevalent over the country that the little man stand out 
and give way to the big one. 
25. See id. at 5312 (remarks of Rep. Powers), 5312-13 (remarks of Rep. Weeks), and 5313-
14 (remarks of Rep. Pujo). 
26. Id. at 5315. 
27. See id. at 5313 (remarks of Rep. Pujo) and at 5314 (remarks of Rep. Powers). 
28. Some senators were concerned that, since the liability of bank shareholders is limited 
to a bank's capital stock, the amendment to the lending limit would encourage banks to main-
tain a very small capital stock and a large surplus. This would permit the shareholders to reap 
large profits with little risk. The Senate compromised on this issue by allowing banks to issue 
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The passage of the amendment to the now-renumbered section 5200, 
and the debate which surrounded it, reveal that even if Congress in 
1863 and 1864 intended the lending limit to serve as a means to 
spread the benefits of credit to the small borrower, it had rejected 
that idea by 1906. 
In 1927, as part of the McFadden Banking Act, Congress 
amended section 5200 in three ways.29 Identical House and Senate 
committee reports comprehensively explain the changes.30 The com-
mittee reports explain that the modifications were only intended to 
clarify certain ambiguities: 
It is not the purpose of this section to make any substantial liberaliza-
tion or restriction upon the business of national banks and the lan-
guage of the bill is therefore substantially identical in effect with that of 
the existing law.3 1 
First, Congress changed the language of the opening section of the 
statute to its present form.32 Second, Congress expanded the defini-
tion of "obligations" under the statute to include the "liability of the 
indorser, drawer, or guarantor . . . ."33 This amendment closed a 
loophole in the statute that allowed a borrower to obtain funds in 
excess of the lending limit by signing as a guarantor on loans to a 
cooperative third party.34 Third, Congress added an additional ex-
ception to the lending limit to facilitate loans secured by nonperish-
able commodities. 35 These amendments to section 5200 were 
intended to rectify shortcomings in the 1906 enactment, not to effec-
tuate any major changes in the statute such as the adoption of the 
benefit-spreading principle. Neither the House nor the Senate de-
bated these amendments to section 5200 during their deliberations 
on the McFadden Banking Act. 
The congressional debate on the McFadden Banking Act cen-
tered on the Act's highly controversial branch banking provisions.36 
obligations equal in value to up to ten percent of their capital stock and ten percent of their 
surplus while limiting the total loans to a single borrower to thirty percent of the capital stock. 
See id. at 8458-61. 
29. See ch. 191, § IO, 44 Stat. 1224, 1229 (1927). 
30. See H.R. REP. No. 83, 69th Cong., Isl Sess. 5 (1926); S. REP, No. 473, 69th Cong,, 1st 
Sess. IO (1926). 
31. Id. Representative McFadden reported for the House co=ittee and Senator Pepper 
for the Senate committee. 
32. See text at note IO supra. 
33. Ch. 191, § 10, 44 Stat. 1224, 1229 (1927). 
34. See note 30 supra. See, e.g., Corsicana Natl. Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 82-83 
(1919) (this case illustrates the loophole). The Comptroller generally uses this language to 
close the loophole, combining loans only when the indirect borrower receives part of the pro-
ceeds of the loans. See note 11 supra. 
35. See ch. 191, § 10, 44 Stat. 1224, 1230 (1927). In addition, see sources cited in note 30 
supra. 
36. See, e.g., 68 CONG. REC. 2178 (1927) (remarks of Rep. Hudspeth). The branch bank-
ing provisions are found at ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1228-29 (1927). The 1927 and 1933 branch 
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The debates pitted the proponents of branch banking, whose chief 
concern was the integrity of the Federal Reserve System, against 
those who opposed the bill on benefit-spreading grounds. Propo-
nents argued that branch banking provisions were necessary to curb 
the exodus of national banks from the Federal Reserve System to 
state systems that allowed branch banking. 37 Opponents argued that 
branch banking would concentrate local deposits in the centralized 
coffers of large financial institutions, thereby placing control over 
credit in the hands of a very few. They feared that this would inter-
fere with the financial autonomy of local communities and would 
profoundly affect "the economic independence of the ordinary small 
businessman[,] who can never find or hope to find the opportunity 
for accommodation from the branch-banking system that he will 
under the American system of independent banks."38 It is reason-
able to believe that if Congress intended section 5200 to spread the 
benefits of credit throughout the community, the proponents of 
branch banking would have pointed this out to allay the concerns of 
their opponents; that they did not do so suggests that no benefit-
spreading motive underlies section 5200. · 
The only suggestion that section 5200 was intended to effectuate 
benefit-spreading came six days after the President signed the Mc-
Fadden Banking Act into law.39 In a statement inserted in the Con-
gressional Record to explain the provisions of the new act, 
Representative McFadden observed: 
The theory of this section is that the funds of a national bank should be 
loaned for the use and benefit of the business men of the community 
who furnish the deposits out of which such loans are made. The sec-
tion is intended to prevent one individual, or a relatively small group, 
from borrowing an unduly large amount of the bank's deposits for the 
use of the particular business enterprises in which they are engaged. It 
is intended to safeguard the bank's depositors by spreading the loans 
among a relatively large number of persons engaged in different lines 
of business.40 
banking amendments, ch. 89, § 23, 48 stat. 189, 190 (1933), undermine the benefit-spreading 
principle. The amendments allow national banks to establish branch banks to the extent al-
lowed by state law. Both at the opening of a new branch and at various times throughout its 
operation, the funds used to meet local credit needs come from other communities where the 
bank has offices, rather than from the co=unity in which the branch exists. This provision 
therefore allows banks to use funds deposited in one community for the use and benefit of the 
businesses in another co=unity. Branch banking therefore goes against the concept of 
spreading the benefits of credit within the community that deposited the funds. 
37. See, e.g., 68 CONG. REC. 2179 (1927) (remarks of Rep. Hudspeth). 
38. Id. at 2168 (remarks of Rep. Hull). Rep. McFadden addressed these fears in a posten-
actment speech. See notes 40-43 infra and accompanying text. 
39. See 68 CONG. REC. 5812-18 (1927). 
40. Id. at 5817. McFadden's theory that all funds deposited by one community should be 
used solely in that co=unity conflicts with the risk-reducing purpose of 12 U.S.C. -§ 84 be-
cause it limits a bank's ability to diversify its loan portfolio properly. See notes 60-61 infra 
and accompanying text; J. CHAPMAN & R. WESTERFIELD, supra note 19 at 223-24. 
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On its face, McFadden's statement suggests that section 5200 was 
amended both to spread benefits and to reduce risk of bank failure. 
This brief pa~sage is the slender thread upon which the Comptroller 
of the Currency hangs his recent benefit-spreading regulations; he 
offers no other support for the regulations from the legislative history 
of the lending limit.41 The Comptroller has mistaken the meaning of 
McFadden's statement and ignored its context. McFadden was 
praising an Act which had already become law and which bore his 
name. In such a laudatory statement, one would expect a politician 
to point out the benefit-spreading effect that necessarily accompanies 
a lending limit.42 But to the extent that the remarks suggest a bene-
fit-spreading intent rather than a benefit-spreading effect incidental 
to the purpose of risk reduction, they are misleading. That sugges-
tion contradicts both McFadden's preenactment statements as re-
porter for the House Banking Committee and congressional 
committee assurances that the amendments to section 5200 were not 
intended to effect major changes in the purposes of the statute.43 
The Comptroller's use of Representative McFadden's post-enact-
ment statement as evidence that Congress intended section 84 to ef-
fectuate benefit-spreading is therefore unwarranted. 
Neither can the Comptroller tum to post-1927 amendments to 
the National Bank Act to support his position that the statute encom-
passed the benefit-spreading principle. The post-1927 amendments 
do nothing more than recodify section 5200 (as section 84 of Title 
XII of the United States Code) and create further exceptions to the 
lending limit. 44 
Court decisions interpreting section 84 and its precursors confirm 
the notion that Congress did not seek to spread benefits through the 
lending limit. In every case where a court has considered combining 
loans to separate parties in assessing compliance with the limit, it has 
41. See note 16 supra. 
42. See text following note 15 supra. 
43. See notes 30-35 supra and accompanying text. 
44. See Rappaport, supra note 4, at 975. The only other mention of the benefit-spreading 
principle in Congress was in 1962, during committee discussion ofH.R. 8247. This bill would 
have increased the lending limit to 20% of the bank's capital stock and surplus. The Comptrol-
ler of the Currency favored the increase, while the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and 
a director of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation opposed it. Comptroller Saxon be-
lieved that, while raising the limit would not increase bank portfolio risk, it could improve the 
ability of small banks to fulfill the credit needs of the larger businesses in their communities. 
See Proposed Bills lo Increase Flexibility for Financial Institutions: Hearings on R.R . .5845, 
R.R. 7878, R.R. 8230, R.R. 824.5, R.R. 8247, R.R. 84.59, R.R. 8.541 Before the House Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 52, 71, 957-58 (1963) (remarks of Comptroller 
Saxon). Federal Reserve Chairman Martin feared that increasing the lending limit would 
increase the risk of bank default and would cause national companies to borrow more, thereby 
taking loanable funds away from other borrowers. Id. at 97 (remarks of Chairman Martin). 
F.D.I.C. Director Wolcott opposed the measure because he thought it would lead to more 
bank failures and because he felt that banks could satisfy legitimate credit needs under the 
existing lending limit. Id. at 156-57 (remarks of Director Wolcott). 
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looked for a common source of repayment rather than a common 
purpose or use of the loans. 
The Supreme Court first examined the lending limit in 1919 in 
Corsicana National Bank v. Johnson.45 In Corsicana, two persons 
each signed two bank notes. The defendant banker, who issued the 
loans, asserted that the borrowers alternated as principal borrower 
and surety on the two notes. But the notes failed to indicate that 
anyone assumed the position of surety. If one of the borrowers on 
each note had assumed surety status, the law at that time required no 
combination of the loans.46 Other evidence revealed that the two 
individuals were liquidating their partnership, that the bank paid out 
the proceeds of the loan by a draft in the partnership name, and that 
the borrowers used the money to pay the partnership's debts. The 
Supreme Court held that the evidence ''would have warranted the 
jury in finding, not withstanding the defendant's denial, that in fact 
the disputed transaction was a single loan."47 It therefore reversed 
the district court, which had directed a verdict for the defendant, and 
remanded the case for further proceedings. 48 
The Court adjudicated Corsicana without recognizing a benefit-
spreading rationale.49 The loans at issue in Corsicana were used for 
a common purpose of paying one partnership's debts. Had the 
Court recognized the benefit-spreading principle, it would have com-
bined the loans regardless of the existence of a surety status.50 In-
stead, the Court carefully searched for evidence sufficient for a jury 
reasonably to find that no principal-surety relationship existed be-
tween the borrowers. 
In the late 1920s, two lower courts also failed to recognize bene-
fit-spreading as a purpose of the lending limit. The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Gamble v. Brown51 refused to combine loans 
made to two individuals though the proceeds of the loans went to 
only one ofthem.52 And in McRoberts v. Spaulding,53 a federal dis-
trict court held that the notes of a husband and his wife could not be 
combined even though the husband received the proceeds of the 
wife's notes. In so holding, the court looked entirely to the direct 
45. 251 U.S. 68 (1919). 
46. See 251 U.S. at 82-83 (1919). In 1927, Congress amended the statute so that the term 
obligations included "the liability of the indorser, drawer, or guarantor." Ch. 191, § IO, 44 
Stat. 1224, 1229 (1927). See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text. 
47. 251 U.S. at 81-82 (1919). 
48. 251 U.S. at 94 (1919). 
49. See 251 U.S. at 83 (1919). 
50. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1320(b) (1980). 
51. 29 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 839 (1929). 
52. 29 F.2d at 381. The court found the directors liable for losses on the loans on the 
theory that the directors had been negligent in their supervision of the bank. 
53. 32 F.2d 315 (S.D. Iowa 1929). 
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liability of each borrower, ignoring the common purpose of the 
loans: 
The fact that these loans were made to individuals would not, even 
though made for the purpose of procuring the money for the use and 
benefit of one of the parties, make the loans a liability as against that 
person for whose use and benefit the money was procured.54 
While these cases do not expressly reject benefit-spreading as a pur-
pose of the lending limit, they reveal that the courts did not recog-
nize such a statutory purpose. 
After the numerous bank failures of the Great Depression, courts 
continued to ignore the benefit-spreading principle. In adjudicating 
the liability of bank directors for losses on loans in violation of the 
lending limit, courts have not combined loans solely on the basis of 
their common use. In State National Bank of Marshall v. Tittle,55 the 
Texas Supreme Court refused to combine loans to an individual and 
a corporation even though all of the proceeds went to the corpora-
tion. Despite this common use, the court would not combine the 
loans without proof that the corporation was liable for the individ-
ual's loans.56 In a more recent case, First National Bank of Lincoln-
wood v. Keller,51 a federal district court refused to combine loans to 
individuals and a corporation without proof that the individuals 
were merely nominal signatories for the corporate loans. The Keller 
decision imposes a much stricter standard for the combination of 
loans than the benefit-spreading rationale for the lending limit. It 
implies that loans to individuals and corporations will not be com-
bined without proof that the corporation both used the loan proceeds 
and intended to repay the loan. Thus, throughout the history of sec-
tion 84, courts have refused to combine loans based on common pur-
poses or use where to do so would make bank directors liable for 
losses on the loans. 
In summary, statutory construction, legislative history, and case 
law all indicate that Congress never intended the section 84 lending 
limit to be used to spread benefits of capital. Congress rejected the 
benefit-spreading principle in 1906, and it has not subsequently 
adopted it. The lack of judicial recognition of benefit-spreading bol-
sters this conclusion. The Comptroller of the Currency should there-
fore not read a benefit-spreading intent into section 84 without 
persuasive policy reasons. And policy considerations weigh heavily 
against such a misreading of the statute. 
54. 32 F.2d at 321. 
55. 143 Tex. 235, 183 S.W.2d 720 (1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 881 (1945). 
56. 143 Tex. at 242, 183 S.W.2d at 723. The reasoning of Tillie was followed in Se!lferl v. 
Stale, which involved an attempt to combine an individual's loan with a corporation's loan 
under a state banking statute similar to 12 U.S.C. § 84. 501 S.W.2d 124 (fex. Crim. App. 
1973). 
57. 318 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
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II. 
In the face of limited competition among banks,58 it may be de-
sirable for the government to spread credit throughout the commu-
nity rather than to allow banks to utilize their market power to favor 
a select group of borrowers.59 The Comptroller's benefit-spreading 
regulations under section 84 represent an attempt to accomplish this 
goal. But section 84 is unsuited to benefit-spreading for three rea-
sons. First, the regulations cannot achieve benefit-spreading without 
undermining the risk-reducing function of section 84. Second, bene-
fit-spreading regulations under section 84 are costly and unfair. Fi-
nally, other statutes much more effectively promote benefit-
spreading while avoiding the shortcomings that accompany the sec-
tion 84 regulations. 
The first problem with the new regulations is that they cannot 
spread benefits within the community unless supplemented by other 
regulations that are inconsistent with the risk-reducing purpose of 
the lending limit. Under present law, banks can easily frustrate the 
benefit-spreading objective by lending to persons outside the com-
munity or by engaging in loan participation agreements. The Comp-
troller cannot curtail these activities while simultaneously promoting 
risk-reduction through the lending limit. 
Congress has never imposed strict geographic limitations on the 
lending activities of national banks. 60 Therefore, even if section 84 
limits the amount a bank can loan to a particular group of individu-
58. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE OF THE COMM. ON BANKING AND 
CURRENCY, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: REFORM AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST (Co=. Print 1973). In 1971, the fifty largest co=ercial banks controlled 
49.3% of all co=ercial bank deposits in the United States. However, co=ercial bank con-
trol of total financial resources in the United States is slowly declining. See Klebanaer, Recent 
Changes in United States' Commercial Banking Structure in Perspective, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 
759 (1973). 
Statutory limitations on certain bank activities, see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (restrictions 
on investment powers), 12 U.S.C. § 27 (1976) (restrictions on bank entry), 12 U.S.C. § 30 
(1976) (approval required for change of name or location), 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1976) (limitation on 
branch banking); 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976) (approval required for merger), though imple-
mented in the interest of bank safety, see United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 
U.S. 602,632 (1974), also limit competition, see Seeley, Banks and Antitrust, 21 Bus. LAW. 917 
(1966). For provisions enacted by Congress to foster competition among banks, see notes 73-
78 infra and accompanying text. 
59. The Co=unity Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. § 290l(b) (Supp. II 1978), evi-
dences congressional concern for unsatisfied credit needs within communities. See text at note 
82 infra. 
60. Some states have required that their banks apportion loans among areas of the state. 
See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 4, at 957. The 1823 charter of the Bank of Alabama required 
banks to apportion loans among counties in proportion to each county's representation in the 
general assembly. Under the Co=unity Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. II 
1978), and regulations issued pursuant to it, banks must delineate their local co=unity for 
lending purposes, but they can still make loans outside that co=unity. See 12 C.F.R. 
§§ 25.2, 25.3 (1980). Congress has yet to establish fixed geographic boundaries for bank lend-
ing activities. 
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als in its community, banks need not react to the limitation by lend-
ing to others in the community. Instead, the bank may tum to 
outside borrowers, thereby frustrating attempts to spread benefits 
within the community. Any limitation on a bank's ability to diver-
sify its loans geographically would in general increase the overall 
risk in its loan portfolio.61 
Banks can also avoid the benefit-spreading regulations by enter-
ing into loan participation agreements. Loan participation agree-
ments enable one bank to purchase or sell a portion of a loan tQ 
another bank. 62 Participations most often occur when a loan exceeds 
a bank's lending limit. The originating bank sells the portion of the 
loan in excess of the lending limit to another bank, enabling the bor-
rower to obtain all the funds he requires through his own bank. As 
consideration for the service of the participating bank, the originat-
ing bank generally either reciprocates by purchasing the participat-
ing bank's participations, or deposits funds in that bank. This 
frustrates the benefit-spreading principle by reducing the credit 
available in the community for other purposes. For example, if the 
reciprocal participations or compensating balances equal the dollar 
amount of the participation sold, the net result is that the large bor-
rower receives all the funds he requires while no one else in the local 
community receives any benefits.63 
Loan participations cannot be prohibited, because they serve two 
vital risk-reducing functions. First, participations enable banks to 
reduce credit risk- the risk that their borrowers will default. For a 
business borrowing from a bank to remain financially sound, the 
bank must provide it with sufficient funds to meet its credit needs. 
Participations enable the bank to continue to fulfill a business's 
credit needs even when they exceed the lending limit. Admittedly, a 
borrower may be able to obtain additional credit from another bank, 
but this subjects the original bank to a potential credit risk that the 
participation arrangement avoids. Because it is difficult to commu-
nicate complete and accurate information about a borrower, the like-
lihood that a borrower's loan will be properly structured declines as 
the number of bankers who directly extend credit to the borrower 
increases. When loans are improperly structured, the risk of loss on 
6 l. See J. CHAPMAN & R. WESTERFIELD, supra note 19, at 223-24. Geographic diversifica-
tion works to reduce risk only if the bank properly supervises its loans. 
62. See H. WALLGREN, PRINCIPLES OF BANK OPERATIONS 221 (rev. ed. 1975). Loan par-
ticipations cannot be arranged in every situation. A bank must find another bank willing to 
participate in the loan. If the loan carries a high credit risk, other banks are unlikely to partici-
pate. Moreover, costs related to arranging and administering small participations make them 
financially impractical. 
63. If the lender defaults, the originating bank stands to lose only the amount of the loan 
retained. Thus, the lending limit serves to reduce the originating bank's risk despite the partic-
ipation. 
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the loans increases. 64 Participations allow a single fully informed 
bank to retain control over a borrower's loans; that bank can design 
a complete loan package that is properly structured with repayment 
terms and collateral support consistent with the borrower's repay-
ment ability and asset-liability composition. Even if a borrower can 
satisfy his additional credit needs elsewhere, reducing the risk of a 
bank's failure, participations still reduce credit risk by enabling a 
bank to maintain full control over the borrower's loans. 
Second, participation agreements enable banks to reduce portfo-
lio risk - the overall risk of loss in the entire loan portfolio - by 
helping banks to better diversify their portfolios. 65 By enabling 
banks to service credit needs in excess of their lending limit, partici-
pations allow banks to choose among a larger group of borrowers. 
This enhances a bank's ability to diversify its loan portfolio with re-
spect to the types of businesses financed, the types of loans issued, 
and the types of credit risks assumed. If participations were not 
available, borrowers would shun banks with lending limits too small 
to fully service their credit needs. For example, a small bank with a 
lending limit of $25,000 could only choose among those borrowers 
whose credit needs did not exceed $25,000. Achieving adequate di-
versity in a loan portfolio selected from such a group of borrowers 
would be quite difficult. 
In addition, participations enable banks to retain successful cus-
tomers whose credit needs outgrow the lending limit of the bank. 
Without participations these customers may decide to take their 
business, including their deposits, to larger banks that can satisfy 
their complete banking needs. Loans to these successful borrowers 
will generally be considered low risk, so the loss of such customers 
will result in an increase of a bank's portfolio risk. Thus, eliminating 
participations would hinder a bank's ability to balance the risk in its 
portfolio not only by limiting the choice of borrowers for the bank to 
service, but also by forcing the bank's most credit-worthy borrowers 
to take their banking business elsewhere. 
The Comptroller will not succeed in spreading benefits through 
section 84 unless geographic diversification and participations are 
prohibited. Yet since both these practices serve risk-reducing func-
tions, they cannot be prohibited without jeopardizing the safety and 
soundness ofbanks.66 Section 84 cannot effectively promote benefit-
64. See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK FOR NATIONAL 
BANK EXAMINERS: COMMERCIAL, INTERNATIONAL§ 205.1 (1977). 
65. See Rappaport, supra note 4, at 967-69. See generally H. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO 
SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1959). 
66. Rappaport argues that the sale of participations may result in concentration of risk in 
the originating bank, because early payments on the loan are used to reduce the participated 
portion first. In addition, he argues that the bank may feel a moral responsibility to assume 
the loan if credit problems occur. See Rappaport, supra note 4, at 971. Rappaport may be 
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spreading without unduly interfering with the statute's risk-reducing 
purpose. 
The section 84 benefit-spreading regulations are costly and unfair 
as well as ineffective. They are costly because bankers normally or-
ganize their loan files on the basis of a borrower's financial liability. 
As a result, they often fail to recognize loans with a common pur-
pose. To avoid violating the benefit-spreading regulations, bankers 
must therefore reorganize their loan records on the basis of each 
loan's purpose.67 Given the multiplicity of purposes loans may have, 
organizing them on this basis presents great practical difficulties.68 
Consumers of banking services ultimately will bear the considerable 
costs of compliance with these regulations. 
The regulations are unfair because they impose an inappropriate 
penalty upon bank directors. When a violation occurs, bank direc-
tors are personally liable to the bank, its shareholders, and its credi-
tors for any losses incurred on loans exceeding the lending limit.69 
That liability seems appropriate when risk-reducing combinations 
add up to a violation of the statute. By approving loans in excess of 
the lending limit, a director subjects the bank to a greater risk of loss 
correct with respect to short-term seasonal operating loans where the participating bank makes 
a short-term commitment to participate, but longer-term secured loans are commonly struc-
tured so that each bank shares in the payments. Thus, in this latter case, the risk is not concen-
trated. Comptroller Saxon, in trying to convince Congress to raise the lending limit, also 
expressed concerns about the effects of participations. He felt that the participation arrange-
ment may lead to "excessive dependence upon a larger correspondent bank" by a smaller bank 
wishing to sell participations. See Hearings on R.R. 5845, R.R. 7878, R.R. 8239, R.R. 8245, 
R.R. 8247, R.R. 8459, R.R. 8541 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, supra 
note 44, at 53. 
Neither Rappaport nor Comptroller Saxon argue that the participation device should be 
banned. To do so without a corresponding increase in the lending limit would pince both 
banks and borrowers in serious financial trouble. Instead, they suggest that participation 
should be limited in certain circumstances. This suggestion seems consistent with the conclu-
sion of this Note. The participation device cannot be eliminated entirely because of the risk-
reducing function it serves in most circumstances. If the benefit-spreading regulations are 
eliminated, the overall number of participations, and their undesirable effects, will decline. 
67. Federal regulations currently require banks to keep a record of the purpose of every 
extension of credit that exceeds $5000 unless the extension of credit is secured by an interest in 
real property. 31 C.F.R. § 103.33 (1978). 
68. Because compliance with the benefit-spreading regulations is extremely difficult, viola-
tions of these regulations are more apt to occur than violations of 12 U.S.C. § 84's risk-reduc-
ing regulations. 
69. 12 U.S.C. § 93 (1976) is the source of liability. The statute requires that directors 
knowingly permit the violation of the lending limit before they can be held liable for losses. 
Yet courts are inclined to impose liability for "even a single deviation from what is expected of 
the prudent bank director." Newman, supra note 9, at 428. See, e.g., Corsicana Natl. Bank v. 
Johnson, 251 U.S. 68 (1919), and Gamble v. Brown, 29 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 
279 U.S. 839 (1929). One court refused to impose liability when an officer concealed the viola-
tion from the directors. See Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936), revd. on other 
grounds, 302 U.S. 643 (1937). 
The liability is measured by the total loss on the uncollected loan rather than just the excess 
over the ten percent limit. See Corsicana Natl. Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 87-88 (1919); 
First Natl. Bank of Lincolnwood v. Keller, 318 F. Supp. 339, 346-47 (N.D. Ill. 1970). 
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on the loans than it would otherwise bear. But this sanction seems 
inappropriate when applied to benefit-spreading combinations that 
exceed the lending limit. By permitting "common-purpose" loans, 
the director has not exposed the bank to a greater risk of loss on the 
loans than normally allowed by the statute. Benefit-spreading loan 
combinations se~e no risk-reducing function: the common use of 
loans issued to unrelated persons with independent sources of repay-
ment does not, in itself, subject the bank to any greater risk of loss 
than if the loans had been used for different purposes. Directors 
who permit common-purpose loans that, when combined, exceed the 
lending limit, are personally liable for all losses on those loans. It 
seems unfair to impose such a potentially exorbitant sanction for vi-
olating the benefit-spreading regulations, 70 especially since the sanc-
tion bestows a fortuitous bonus upon the bank, its shareholders, and 
its creditors.71 
There is one final reason why benefit-spreading regulations 
under section 84 seem ill-advised. Other statutes more effectively 
spread the benefits of capital throughout the community without the 
drawbacks of the section 84 benefit-spreading regulations. This al-
ternative legislation is of two types. First, several statutes counter 
the effects of limited bank competition.72 The courts apply relevant 
provisions of the Sherman73 and Clayton74 Acts to bank mergers to 
maintain competition.75 These provisions also prohibit anti-compet-
itive behavior such as interest-rate fixing, uniform service charges,76 
70. As an indication of Congress's judgment of a fair penalty for failure of a bank to serve 
the community adequately, one need only look to the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 
12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. II 1978). The social policy at issue is benefit-spreading; the 
penalty for violation is that a bank may be denied an "application for a deposit facility." 12 
U.S.C. § 2903 (Supp. II 1978). 
71. The community harmed by a bank's failure to spread the benefits of credit deserves a 
remedy for that failure, rather than the bank or its creditors, who are neither harmed by the 
directors' action nor particularly deserving of benefit An example of an appropriate sanction 
is 12 U.S.C. § 93(b) (Supp. n 1978), whic!J. authorizes courts to impose civil penalties ofup to 
$ 1000 a day on a bank or on any officer, director, employee or agent of a bank that violates the 
National Bank Act or any regulations promulgated under it. However, because of the practi-
cal difficulty in combining loans according to their purpose, see notes 67-68 supra and accom-
panying text, the Comptroller should impose this sanction sparingly ifhe continues to enforce 
benefit-spreading regulations. For an even better sanction, see note 70 supra. 
72. Some attribute the unavailability of credit in some sectors of communities to insuffi-
cient competition among banks and lending institutions. See llEPoRT, supra note 58, at 1-2. 
73. 15 u.s.c. 1-7 (1976). 
74. 15 u.s.c. 12-27 (1976). 
15. See Seeley, supra note 58. See, e.g., United States v. Phillipsburg Natl. Bank & Trust 
Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970); United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); 
United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The 
Bank Merger Act, 80 Stat. 7 (1966), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976), regulates bank mergers, consol-
idations, and takeovers. 
16. See, e.g., United States v. Duluth Clearing House Assoc., (1979] FED. BANKING L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 11,314.16 at 6307 (D.C. Minn. 1964). 
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and unfair and deceptive practices. 77 Congress has also enacted leg-
islation prohibiting banks from abusing their market power through 
tie-in loan provisions unrelated to the soundness of the credit.78 
Moreover, on March 31, 1980, the President signed the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act into law. This 
Act takes substantial measures to increase competition among banks 
and between banks and other financial institutions.79 
Second, Congress has passed legislation to ensure that credit is 
available to needy areas of the community that banks tend to ig-
nore. 80 For example, Congress has established the National Con-
sumer Cooperative Bank to finance cooperative credit facilities for 
the benefit of the poor, the elderly, and the underprivileged.81 To 
the extent that these programs fail to meet credit needs neglected by 
local banks, the recently enacted Community Reinvestment Act82 re-
quires each bank to fulfill its community's "need for credit services 
as well as deposit services" as long as it can do so consistent "with 
the safe and sound operation" of the bank. 83 These legislative meas-
ures provide a much more direct and effective means to implement 
benefit spreading than section 84. Their existence renders the section 
84 regulations unnecessary. 
CONCLUSION 
By combining loans according to common purpose in enforcing 
section 84, the Comptroller of the Currency ostensibly seeks to eff ec-
tuate congressional intent to use the lending limit to spread the bene-
fits of credit throughout the community. This Note has shown not 
only that Congress never harbored such an intent, but also that the 
Comptroller's regulations could not realize that intent even if it ex-
isted. The regulations do little to spread benefits, since they are eas-
77. See 15 V.S.C. § 57a (1976). 
78. See 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1976). 
79. The Act extends Federal Reserve Board reserve requirements to all depository institu-
tions; prescribes a six-year phase-out of Regulation Q interest rate ceilings on deposits; over-
rides state usury ceilings on certain type of loans; increases limits on federally insured deposit 
accounts to $100,000; greatly expands the trust and loan activities in which federal savings and 
loan associations may participate; extends negotiable orders of withdrawal (NOW) accounts 
nationwide; and authorizes automatic transfer accounts for commercial banks, remote service 
units for savings and loan associations, and share drafts for credit unions. See FED. BANKING 
L. REP. No. 805 (CCH), RESPONSIBILITIES & LIABILITIES OF BANK DIRECTORS 6 (March 10, 
1980). 
80. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2901-05 (West Supp. 1980); see 
Dennis, The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977: .Defining "Convenience and Needs of the 
Community", 95 BANKING L. J. 693 (1978). 
81. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3001, 3011 (Supp. II 1978). 
82. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2905 (Supp. II 1978). 
83. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (Supp. II 1978). For further explanation of the Act, see Dennis, supra 
note 80, and Healey, Banker's Guide lo the Community Reinvestment Act, 96 BANKING L. J. 605 
(1979). 
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ily avoided by participation agreements and loans to borrowers in 
other communities. Because the regulations are costly and unfair as 
well as ine.ff ective, Congress would be well advised to rely on other 
more appropriate legislation to ensure that adequate credit is avail-
able throughout each community. The Comptroller should retract 
the regulations, and courts should ignore them in the meantime. 
